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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court decided more patent cases in 2014 than any previous year. It
lowered the standard for awarding fees in patent cases, clarified that the patent holder
carries the burden of showing infringement even in declaratory judgment actions, lowered
the standard for invalidating patent claims as vague, and rejected the theory that
infringement may occur by simply adding the actions of separate parties. The most
important case, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, announced a test for patentable
subject matter, especially for software and business method inventions, that was
considerably more restrictive than case law to date.
Meanwhile, the most notable case in copyright seemed to go in the opposite direction,
raising the level of copyright protection for software, perhaps even creating a split in the
circuits. In Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the application
programming interfaces of the Java programming language were copyrightable
expression, as opposed to non-copyrightable functional matter. The Supreme Court held
that rebroadcast of television programs infringed the public performance right, even where
done using technology that effectively gave each viewer a personal antenna. The Court
also rejected the application of laches in copyright cases, permitting litigation of longstanding infringement.
Other cases provided important precedent on evergreen issues in intellectual
property law. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton reversed a safe harbor approach to the
application of fair use to university coursebooks. Garcia v. Google, Inc. raised the
possibility that anyone who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, may have
their own separate copyright. Trademark cases addressed such questions as who may bring
a false advertising case, when matter is functional, when trademarks become generic or
are otherwise abandoned, when others may use a mark to describe things, and when a
mark may be cancelled as disparaging of a group of people. In trade secret, the Third
Circuit avoided the surprisingly important issue of liability for account slurping. Other
cases dealt with the interfaces between trade secret and contract and between trade secret
and patent. Courts also dealt with the balance between disclosing information to potential
partners and maintaining sufficient security measures to qualify for trade secret protection.

Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Thanks to Lorie Graham, Ian McJohn, Heidi
Harvey, Joseph Koipally, and my Suffolk IP colleagues, Andy Beckerman-Rodau, Chris Gibson, Leah
Chan Grinvald, Rebecca Curtin, Mike Rustad, and Jessica Silbey.
Comments welcome: smcjohn@suffolk.edu.
*
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The Supreme Court decided more patent-related cases in 2014 than in any previous
year. 1 It lowered the standard for awarding fees in patent cases, 2 clarified that the patent
holder carries the burden of showing infringement even in declaratory judgment actions,3
lowered the standard for invalidating patent claims as vague, 4 and rejected the theory that
infringement may occur by simply adding the actions of separate parties. 5 The most
important case, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 6 announced a test for patentable
subject matter, especially for software and business method inventions, that was
considerably more restrictive than case law to date.
Meanwhile, the most notable case in copyright seemed to go in the opposite direction,
raising the level of copyright protection for software, perhaps even prompting a potential
circuit split. In Oracle Inc. v. Google Inc., 7 the Federal Circuit held that the application
programming interfaces of the Java programming language were copyrightable expression,
as opposed to non-copyrightable functional matter. Further, the Supreme Court held that
rebroadcast of television programs infringed the public performance right, even when using
technology that effectively gave each viewer a personal antenna. 8 The Court also rejected
the application of laches in copyright cases, permitting litigation of long-standing
infringement. 9
Other cases provided important precedent on evergreen issues in intellectual property
law. Cambridge University Press v. Patton 10 reversed a safe harbor approach to the
application of fair use to university course books. Garcia v. Google, Inc. 11 raised the
possibility that anyone who contributes to a work, such as an actor in a film, may have her
own separate copyright. Trademark cases addressed such questions as who may bring a
false advertising case, when matter is functional, when trademarks become generic or are
otherwise abandoned, when others may use a mark to describe things, and when a mark
may be cancelled as disparaging of a group of people. In trade secret, the Third Circuit
avoided the surprisingly important issue of liability for account slurping. 12 Other cases
dealt with the interfaces between trade secret and contract law 13 and between trade secret
and patent law. 14 Courts also addressed the balance between disclosing information to
At least, going back to 1952. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION,
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html.
2
See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
3
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
4
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
5
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
6
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
7
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
8
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc , 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
9
Petrella v. MGM, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
10
769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair Use Cases of 2014, TECH. &
MKTG. LAW BLOG, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guestblog-post.htm.
11
766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted en banc, 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir.).
12
See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014).
13
See Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer 742 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2014).
14
See Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014).
1
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potential partners and maintaining sufficient security measures to qualify for trade-secret
protection. 15
I. PATENT
A. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International 16

17

¶4

Alice will likely finally set the test for patentable subject matter. Patentable subject
matter does not include abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomena. 18 After
leaving those exclusions undefined for decades, the Court decided three cases in recent
years that help define the contours of patentable subject matter. The Court held: (1) in
Bilski v. Kappos, 19 that a method for hedging risk was an unpatentable abstract idea; (2) in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 20 that a diagnostic method that
simply adjusted dosages of a drug based on blood-test results was an unpatentable claim to
a natural law; and (3) in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,21
that human DNA is an unpatentable natural phenomenon. Those cases clarified the certain
aspects previously unsettled case law, but left important questions open, such as whether
courts should analyze the three exceptions similarly and how they applied to software
patents. In 2014, the Court addressed those questions in Alice, which dealt with the
patentability of “a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’–i.e., the

See Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 53, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d
714, 735-36 (2014).
16
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
17
The illustrations in this article from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking
Glass are by John Tenniel. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1st prtg. 1865);
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS (1st prtg. 1871), available at http://www.alice-inwonderland.net/alice2a.html.
18
134 S. Ct. at 2354.
19
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
20
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
21
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
15
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risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation” by
using a third-party intermediary.” 22
Alice held that the underlying policy for all three exclusions was the risk that a patent
would pre-empt a basic tool of scientific and technological work. 23 Monopolization of such
tools would impede rather than promote innovation, and thus inhibit further discovery. 24
The Alice Court also recognized that “[a]t the same time, we tread carefully in construing
this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, ‘all
inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.’” 25 An invention is not rendered ineligible for a patent simply because it
involves an abstract concept. Further, as the Court put it, “[a]pplication[s]” of such
concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’ we have said, remain eligible for patent protection.”26
To balance these concerns, the Court held that a single test, drawn from Mayo, was the
framework for analyzing patentable subject matter under all three exceptions:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the
claims before us?” To answer that question, we consider the elements of
each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a
patent-eligible application. We have described step two of this analysis as a
search for an “inventive concept”—i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” 27

¶6

¶7

Applying the first part of the test, the Court held that “[l]ike the risk hedging in Bilski,
the concept of intermediated settlement is ‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent
in our system of commerce.’” 28 In this respect, the Court broadened patentable subject
matter to encompass considerations of novelty and nonobviousness. 29 Whether something
is an abstract idea could now depend not just on the idea, but whether it is well-known.
Turning to the second step, the Alice court held that “the claims at issue are drawn to
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”30
Although the Court never used the word “software,” this analysis has broad implications
for software patents. Importantly, simply incorporating a computer in the invention will
134 S. Ct. at 2352.
Id. at 2354.
24
Id. at 2354 (citing Bilksi, Mayo, and Myriad).
25
Id.
26
Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
27
Id. at 2355 (citation omitted).
28
Id. at 2356 (citation omitted).
29
On the topic of nonobviousness: Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. was
seen by some as making it easier to find pharmaceutical inventions obvious, by raising the higher standard
for unexpected results that indicate a chemical compound is nonobvious. 752 F. 3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See Gitrada Harmon, Obviousness Analysis For New Chemical Compounds (2014), draft on file with
author.
30
134 S. Ct. at 2347.
22
23

322

Vol. 13:3]

¶8

¶9

Stephen McJohn

not make an idea patentable. However, the Court did give some guidance as to what would
make computer-related inventions patentable: “The method claims do not, for example,
purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field.” 31
After Alice, the framework for addressing patentable subject matter is the two-step
test from Mayo. The content of those steps, however, remains uncertain. For example, the
Court did not attempt to define “abstract idea.” 32 Perhaps, this is because, at some level,
every invention must rest on one or more abstract ideas. The second step likewise is
flexible. It suggests that a method may be patentable if it improves the functioning of a
computer or affects an improvement in some technical field. 33 A broad reading would be
that any improvement in software improves how a computer works. A narrower reading
would provide patent eligibility only for software intended to make the computer itself
work better, as opposed to software that accomplishes an established task in a different
manner (e.g., faster, more reliably, more securely, etc.). Yet no bright-line distinction exists
between the two. Likewise, “technical field” is not a clear boundary. But the underlying
policy – avoiding the preemption of building-block technologies – may provide sufficient
guidance. For instance, in copyright law, a similar test – the elusive distinction between
non-copyrightable ideas and copyrightable expression – serving merely to clarify any
policy issues, has worked well for decades. 34
The Federal Circuit soon implemented the approach newly defined in Alice, holding
that delivering advertising with online video content to be outside patentable subject
matter, which the Federal Circuit had twice previously held to be within patentable subject
matter. 35 Thus, the Federal Circuit has assuredly taken a new direction in the wake of Alice.
But before the year was out, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a software process for
maintaining the look and feel of a website, meaning perhaps that sufficiently specific
software patents will survive the Alice test. 36 In addition, as technology heads toward the
Internet of Things, 37where online software will likely control many physical devices,
various software inventions may be concrete enough to pass Alice.
B. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 38

¶10

Nautilus concerned a patent on a heart monitor. Specifically, some argued that the
claim language indicating electrodes with a “spaced relationship” with one another was too
vague, thus rendering the patent invalid.

Id. at 2359 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2350.
33
Id.
34
See Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343 (2009).
35
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
36
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.2014).
37
“In what’s called the Internet of Things, sensors and actuators embedded in physical objects—from
roadways to pacemakers—are linked through wired and wireless networks, often using the same Internet
Protocol (IP) that connects the Internet.” Michael Chui, et al., The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY Q., March
2010, available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_things.
38
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
31
32
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¶11

Commentators have criticized patent claims, especially in software patents, as too
vague to provide proper notice of the scope of the claimed invention. 39 An inventor must
submit claims “particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as [the] invention.” 40 The Federal Circuit’s test on the issue was
relatively patentee-friendly, holding that a claim was only invalid for vagueness if it was
“insolubly ambiguous.” 41 If the court could reach any clear interpretation of the claim, it
survived. As in Alice, the Supreme Court in Nautilus sought to balance competing policies:
“The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that
absolute precision is unattainable.” 42
¶12
The Court formulated a test to reconcile those interests: “Cognizant of the competing
concerns, we read § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the
specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty.” 43
¶13
Patent claim interpretation is notoriously difficult, because patents rely on technical
language and are drafted with many goals in mind, including obfuscation. 44 Every patent
claim should be unique, because it should claim a unique invention. 45 To determine
whether a word or phrase can be understood with “reasonable certainty” in a sui generis
document may often be elusive.
C. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC 46
¶14

Clear patent claims are difficult to draft, as Nautilus reflects. The Patent Act offers
various tools to deal with that, including means-plus-function claims. 47 Section 112 allows
an inventor, rather than listing every element of structure in the invention, to simply
describe an element as a means to accomplish a task. 48 The court then interprets the patent
claim to cover the means that the inventor discloses in the description of the invention. 49
That makes claim drafting easier but limits the breadth of the patent claim to the means
described. A product very similar to the inventor’s product, but which uses a different
means for that one element, will not infringe. So applicants often avoid means-plusfunction claims to avoid narrower protection. 50 The Federal Circuit has reached
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009).
40
134 S. Ct. at 2124 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006)) (alteration in original).
41
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
42
Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
43
Id.
44
Stephen McJohn, Patents: Hiding From History, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
961 (2008).
45
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (providing that an invention is patentable only if new and not anticipated
by prior inventions).
46
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
47
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.”).
48
Id.
49
Id. (“[S]uch claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described
in the specification and equivalents thereof.”).
50
See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
905, 918 (“The result is that means-plus-function claiming today is viewed as narrow and easy for potential
39
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inconsistent conclusions as to whether expert testimony is necessary to show a lack of
structure in the means-plus-function analysis. 51 The Federal Circuit has also held that the
necessary structure, for a computer-related invention such as smartphone technology, may
be found looking to a broad array of sources in the specification, such as “an outline of an
algorithm, a flowchart, or a specific set of instructions or rules.” 52
¶15
Whether a claim is in means-plus-function form 53 depends on how the claim is
interpreted. The issue can determine an infringement case. In Williamson, the issue was
whether the word “module” referred to structure or whether “module” referred to a means
for accomplishing a function, meaning the claim would read only on products that
contained the same means described in the patent. 54 The majority held that “module” did
connote hardware or software structure, and was not merely a “nonce” word that needed
specific definition of structure from the written description of the invention. 55
¶16
As the case reflects, a split has developed within the Federal Circuit on the proper
approach to determine if a claim is a means-plus-function claim. 56 The issue has particular
import for software patents, which often include elements in functional form. 57 Whether
that element is treated as means-plus-function can determine the breadth and validity of the
claim.
D. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 58
¶17

Patent claims are often quite complex. In order to infringe a claim, all elements of
the claim must be met. In some cases, different parties perform different steps of a patented
process. For instance, Akamai’s patent covered a method of delivering electronic data over
a content delivery network, including the step of tagging the data. 59 Limelight allegedly
performed most of the steps, but had its customers tag the data. The question in Akamai
was whether that constituted infringement, if all steps were performed but not all steps
performed by the same person. 60 Specifically, secondary liability requires that there be

infringers to evade. Patent lawyers tend to avoid means-plus-function claim language, except as an “extra”
put in a separate claim to hedge risk.”).
51
Elcommerce.com, Inc. v. SAP AG, 745 F.3d 490 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
52
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
53
That is, it is limited to the particular means described in the application.
54
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Appellees argue that the
‘distributed learning control module’ limitation is drafted in the same format as a traditional means-plusfunction limitation, and merely replaces the term ‘means’ with the ‘nonce’ word ‘module,’ thereby
connoting a generic ‘black box’ for performing the recited computer-implemented functions. In Appellees'
view, since the term should be treated as a means-plus-function claim term and there is no algorithmic
structure for implementing the claimed functions in the written description, the finding of indefiniteness
should be affirmed.”).
55
Id. at 1379-80.
56
See Jason Rantanen, Williamson v. Citrix: Means-Plus-Function, Presumptions, and “Nonce”
Words, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 3, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/12/williamson-functionpresumptions.html. A similar and unsettled issue with mechanical inventions is whether the phrase
“adapted to” refers to structure capable of or specifically intended to serve the relevant purpose.
57
See Lemley, supra note 50.
58
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
59
Id. at 2115.
60
Id. at 2117.
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infringement. 61 Could there be induced infringement if no single actor infringed? The
Federal Circuit had held that there could be induced infringement, on the theory that the
party caused others to perform steps for infringement. 62 The Supreme Court rejected this
theory, reasoning that there could not be secondary infringement without a direct
infringer. 63 In short, The Supreme Court rejected that theory of “divided infringement.” 64
¶18
Notably, the Federal Circuit could still reach essentially the same result if it rejects
its earlier holding in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp. 65 The Supreme Court in Akamai
noted that the Federal Circuit had taken a very narrow view on joint infringement, in
contrast to its broad view of divided infringement. 66 In Muniauction, the Federal Circuit
had limited the application of joint infringement to where the two parties acted in a
principle agency relationship or have contractual obligations. 67 If courts viewed joint
infringement more pragmatically, such as where a software company directs a customer to
perform certain steps, then joint infringement would apply to cases facts like Akamai. The
Federal Circuit may revisit Muniauction in light of Akamai. This has considerable practical
implications for licensing agreements. In litigation practice, parties may rely more on
clauses and licensing to show joint infringement, and, in transactional practice, parties may
craft agreements to avoid it. 68

Id.
Id.
63
Id. at 2117-18.
64
The briefs in Akamai raised a remarkable argument, suggesting that the Federal Circuit approach
would encourage parties to draft patent claims in the passive voice, allowing for an infringement if anyone
anywhere, in aggregate, performed the steps of a patented process. E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 21,
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014) (No. 12-786), available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12786_pet_reply.authcheckdam.pdf. Such a claim drafting technique was termed the “aggressive passive
voice” by participants at the Fourth IP Scholars’ Roundtable: Intellectual Property on the Ground,
University of New Hampshire School of Law, November 21-22, 2014.
65
532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.2008).
66
134 S. Ct. at 2119.
67
Id.
68
See Jean-Paul Ciardullo & Cynthia J. Rigsby, After the Supreme Court's Limelight Decision,
Attention May Shift to Contract Analysis in Patent Cases, IP LITIG. CURRENT (July 2, 2014)
http://www.iplitigationcurrent.com/2014/07/02/limelight-shift-attention-contract-analysis/.
61
62
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E. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. 69 & Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Management Systems 70
Octane Fitness made it easier for district courts to award attorney’s fees to successful
parties in patent litigation. 71 The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test for the
award of attorney’s fees under the patent statute. 72 The Federal Circuit defined an
“exceptional case” as one which either involves “material inappropriate conduct” or is both
“objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.” 73 The Court characterized the
Federal Circuit’s test as rigid and unnecessarily narrow. 74 Rather, the Court held, “an
‘exceptional' case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive
strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of
the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” 75 The Court
considered the totality of the circumstances, permitting a much broader approach than the
Federal Circuit had permitted. 76
¶20
A companion case, Highmark, also made it more likely that a trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees would survive. 77 The Supreme Court overturned Federal Circuit precedent
reviewing such decisions de novo, holding instead that a district court decision to award
attorney’s fees is subject to review only as to whether it was an abuse of discretion. 78
¶21
These two cases changed the dynamics of patent enforcement. On the one hand, it is
now riskier to seek enforcement of a questionable patent. On the other, it is now riskier to
resist enforcement of a valid patent. Confident parties choosing to resist dubious patent
claims now find themselves in a better position.
¶19

F. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC 79
¶22

Several years back, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 80 lowered the standard for
bringing declaratory judgment actions in patent cases by making it easier to challenge
patents. The case left several questions open, including who would have the burden of
proof. 81 If a patent holder sues for infringement, the patent holder has the burden of
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
71
134 S. Ct. at 1758. (“[N]othing in [35 U.S.C.] § 285 justifies such a high standard of proof. Section
285 demands a simple discretionary inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a
high one.”).
72
Id. at 1756 (“This formulation superimposes an inflexible framework onto statutory text that is
inherently flexible.”).
73
Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
74
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
78
Id. at 1749 (“We therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard
in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination.”).
79
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
80
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
81
As the Medtronic court put it, the open question was: “A patent licensee paying royalties into an
escrow account under a patent licensing agreement seeks a declaratory judgment that some of its products
are not covered by or do not infringe the patent, and that it therefore does not owe royalties for those
69
70
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showing infringement. If, instead, an alleged infringer sues, seeking a declaratory judgment
that it is not infringing, does it bear the burden of showing noninfringement? Medtronic
held that the burden of showing infringement rests on the patent holder. 82 Any other rule
would create a possible inconsistency in determinations, as well as a possible chill against
parties subjected to likely invalid intellectual property rights. 83 The Court reasoned that
the licensee may have initiated the suit, but the patent holder “is in a better position than
an alleged infringer to know, and to be able to point out, just where, how, and why a product
(or process) infringes a claim of that patent.” 84 Medtronic removes a significant obstacle
to challenging patents. If the burden of proof of noninfringement were on the party bringing
a declaratory judgment action, that would make parties less likely to file suit to challenge
patents.
G. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 85
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, among other things, makes it more difficult for a party
holding the patent on industry standards to prevent others from using those standards, even
where no license agreement is in effect. 86 A party with such a standard essential patent may
have agreed in general to license it to others in the industry under reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. 87 There may be considerable disagreement however about what
terms are reasonable. Until other parties have obtained such a license, the patent holder
might seek an injunction to prevent them using the relevant technology. Motorola,
however, held that an injunction may not necessarily be awarded in such a case 88. One
factor for injunctive relief is whether a sufficient remedy is available through damages. 89
The court held that damages may be sufficient, making an injunction unavailable, because
the right to pay royalties and use the technology has been established by agreement. 90
¶24
The holding may cut two ways with respect to standard-setting patents. Where a party
has agreed to contribute a standard-setting patent, others may use the standard knowing
that they will be likely subject only to damages for a reasonable royalty, as opposed to an
injunction against use. That may speed licensing transactions. But the holding may delay
the initial contribution, because a party with a potential standard patent will know that once
it agrees to contribute the patent, it will no longer have control over whether others use the
technology.
¶23

products. In that suit, who bears the burden of proof, or, to be more precise, the burden of persuasion? Must
the patentee prove infringement or must the licensee prove noninfringement?” 134 S. Ct. at 849..
82
Id.
83
Id. at 850.
84
Id.
85
Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
86
Id. (affirming denial of injunction to party holding industry standard patents).
87
Id. at 1323-24 (discussing Motorola’s licensing of its standard-essential patent portfolio subject to
obligation to license at fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms).
88
Id. at 1331-32.
89
Id. at 1332.
90
Id. (“ Motorola's FRAND commitments, which have yielded many license agreements encompassing
the '898 patent, strongly suggest that money damages are adequate to fully compensate Motorola for any
infringement.”).
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H. Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co. 91
¶25

Qimonda AG, a German semiconductor manufacturer, had patent cross licenses with
many of its competitors. 92 In industries like electronics, such licenses allow parties to have
a truce with respect to patents. Qimonda filed bankruptcy and ceased operations, so no
longer needed the protection of the cross licenses. 93 Rather, it terminated the licenses under
German bankruptcy law, to renegotiate licenses under which it would instead receive
royalty payments. 94
¶26
Qimonda filed a chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States, to do the
same with its American licenses. 95 The representative “committed to re-license Qimonda's
patent portfolio to the Licensees at a reasonable and nondiscriminatory ("RAND")
royalty.” 96 Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the representative of a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding to file an ancillary proceeding in the United States. 97 It also allows
broad recognition of orders entered in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding. 98 But the
recognition is subject to certain safeguards. The US bankruptcy court may refuse to apply
the foreign order if “the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States." 99 In addition, the court must ensure that "the interests of the creditors and
other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected." 100
¶27
US bankruptcy law provides special protection for intellectual property licensees. 101
Even where a bankrupt licensor rejects the license in bankruptcy, the licensee may continue
to use the rights, provided it performs its obligations under the license. 102 German
bankruptcy law, by contrast, allows a licensor to simply terminate a license. 103 Jaffé
addressed a question with little precedent, given that Chapter 15 is relatively new: how
extensive are the limits to recognizing foreign rules within US bankruptcy proceedings? In
particular, is the applicable standard relatively high, rejecting only foreign orders that are
“manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States,” 104 or also broadly
protective, requiring general protection of all interested parties 105? Jaffé blended the
standards somewhat. It upheld refusal to terminate the licenses, because termination would
adversely affect the licensees (by denying them the protection normally afforded under US
law), which in turn would affect public policy, because harm to the licensees might “slow
the pace of innovation in the United States, to the detriment of the U.S. economy.” 106

Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 17.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 21.
97
11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012).
98
11 U.S.C. §§ 1520-1521 (2012).
99
11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012).
100
11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2012).
101
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012).
102
Id.
103
Jaffé, 737 F.3d at 17 (discussing § 103 of the German Insolvency Code).
104
11 U.S.C. § 1506.
105
11 U.S.C. § 1522(a).
106
Jaffé, 737 F.3d at 32.
91
92
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I. Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. 107 & DSM Desotech Inc. v.
3D Systems Corp. 108

¶28

Antitrust liability will normally not lie for filing a patent infringement suit against a
competitor, under the doctrine of "Noerr-Pennington immunity." 109 But that immunity will
not be obtained if the litigation is a sham, brought baselessly simply to harm competition.110
Tyco addressed two issues with respect to that interplay between the exclusionary power
of a patent and anti-trust law’s limits on exclusionary conduct that harms competition.111
First, the court held that liability for fraudulent procurement of patents could apply where
a party does not fraudulently obtain patents, but acquired them with and has the requisite
knowledge, but that the necessary knowledge was not shown in that case. 112 It also held
that litigation to enforce of the patents was not baseless as matter of law, because the patent
owner proposed a factually plausible theory of infringement. 113
¶29
But, beyond patent litigation, the patent owner had also filed a petition with the Food
and Drug Administration to prevent the generic maker from marketing its version of the
drug. 114 The patent owner argued that the sham exception to immunity was limited to
litigation in court. 115 Only a patent law suit that was manifestly contrary to governing

Tyco Healthcare Group v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 749 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
109
See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
110
See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
111
762 F.3d at 1349.
112
Id. at 1349-50.
113
Id. at 1344-45.
114
Id. at 1341.
115
Id. at 1347.
107
108
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science would be subject to the exception as baseless. 116 The appellate court held, however,
that the sham exception could also apply in administrative proceedings. 117
¶30
DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems is significant for antitrust law on developing
technologies. 118 Desotech alleged that 3D Systems tried to monopolize the market for
replacement resin cartridges for the 3D printer by using technological locks to prevent the
use of the cartridges of its competitors. 119 The court held that Desotech did not show a
distinct market for stereolithography 3D printers and their resin (of which 3D Systems sold
the majority), where other technologies might serve as substitutes. 120
J. In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh) 121

¶31

Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. held that human DNA
was not patentable. 122 Even if the inventor had succeeded in isolating and purifying the
DNA, it was still a product of nature not within patentable subject matter. 123 But the Court
held that cDNA, a molecule made by taking only the portions of human DNA that code for
a gene, was patentable, because it was not a natural phenomenon. 124 After Myriad, an
important question remains: how different must an invention be from a naturally occurring
phenomenon to qualify for patent protection? The issue has great practical importance,
because many inventions are made by modifying naturally occurring substances. 125

Id.
Id.
118
DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., 749 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing
development of "rapid-prototyping technology").
119
Id. at 1339.
120
Id. at 1344-45, 1347.
121
In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
122
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
123
Id. at 2111.
124
Id. at 2119.
125
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding genetically engineered bacterium
was within patentable subject matter).
116
117
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In re Roslin Institute addressed the issue, as applied to a famous sheep. 126 It held
patents related to the famous cloned sheep Dolly to be invalid, for failure to claim sufficient
differences between the sheep providing the source of the cloned cells and the resulting
cloned animal. 127 The patentee pointed to differences between a clone and a natural version
of an organism but failed to show that the patent claims included those characteristics. 128
II. TRADEMARK
A. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 129

¶33

The federal trademark statute provides a cause of action much broader than
trademark infringement: false advertising. 130 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes
liability on anyone who “in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities.” 131 Not everyone aggrieved by false advertising,
however, can sue under this provision. Lexmark sold printers and toner cartridges. 132
Lexmark equipped its cartridges with microchips used for verification, to encourage
customers only to use Lexmark cartridges. 133 Static Control sold microchips which allow
competitors of Lexmark to refurbish and resell Lexmark cartridges. 134 Static Control
alleged that Lexmark issued false advertising to the effect it was illegal to use static controls
microchips. 135 Reasoning that the provision was intended to protect against unfair
competition, most courts had limited standing to competitors. 136 Under this approach,
Static Control would lack standing to sue Lexmark for false advertising.
¶34
The Supreme Court took a slightly broader view. The statute allows a suit by “any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 137 The court
did not read the language would allow anyone to sue for false advertising. 138 Rather, the
Court limited standing to those with interests “within the zone of interests protected by the
law invoked.” 139 For false advertising, that would be required that “a plaintiff must allege
an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales” and “economic or reputational
injury flowing directly from the deception.” 140 That would not include consumers or
business misled by false advertising into buying goods or services, or parties indirectly
harmed by false advertising, such as suppliers of a company whose sales plummeted due

750 F.3d at 1334.
Id. at 1337.
128
Id. at 1337-38.
129
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
130
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
131
Id.
132
134 S. Ct. at 1383.
133
Id. at 1383.
134
Id. at 1384.
135
Id. at 1383.
136
Id. at 1384-85.
137
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
138
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391.
139
Id. at 1388 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
140
Id. at 1390-91.
126
127
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to falsities. 141 But it did include Static Control. Lexmark’s false advertising allegedly stated
that Static’s Control’s products were illegal, harming Static Control’s sales. 142
B. Ferring Pharmaceuticals v. Watson Pharmaceuticals 143

The Supreme Court in eBay 144 altered the general approach of automatically granting
injunctions once infringement was shown in patent cases. There are some arguments that
injunctions should be more readily granted in trademark actions. 145 Patent cases often
involve large damage, but trademark actions less so. 146 Trademark infringement requires
showing the use of a symbol that is likely to cause confusion or deception. 147 Injury to
reputation may not be as readily remedied with monetary damages. 148 Similarly, some
courts have applied a presumption of automatic harm in false advertising cases, on the
theory that a “misleading comparison to a specific competing product necessarily
diminishes that product's value in the minds of the consumer.” 149
¶36
Ferring Pharmaceuticals rejected that presumption. The court noted that some courts
have extended the eBay analysis to copyright cases 150. It reasoned that eBay was based not
on the special characteristics of patents, but rather on general principles of equity that
govern when the powerful remedy of an injunction should be imposed. 151 Before ordering
a defendant to shut down a line of business, a court should normally require actual, not
merely presumed, harm. 152 If harm is indeed so likely to occur in a false advertising case,
then it should be easy for the plaintiff to show harm resulted. In Ferring Pharmaceuticals,

¶35

Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1393-94.
143
Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2014).
144
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
145
David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1037, 1055 (2009).
146
Id.
147
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
148
Bernstein & Gilden, supra note 145.
149
Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988)).
150
Id. at 213-214.
151
Id. at 215-216.
152
Id.
141
142
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the court further held, there was not a sufficient showing of irreparable harm. 153 Watson
allegedly broadcast false statements about a pharmaceutical in a webcast to medical
professionals. 154 The statements were no longer available and there was no evidence that
they would actually affect whether doctors prescribed and patients used the
pharmaceutical. 155
C. Elliot v. Google Inc. 156

Escalator patent

Thermos by another name

¶37

Aspirin, Cellophane, Dry ice, Escalator, Laundromat, Mimeograph, Pilates,
Thermos, Trampoline and Zipper all began as brand names and ended as generic names for
a product. In some cases, the product was patented, so only the patentee could sell it,
making the patentee’s name especially likely for public adoption. “Thermos,” from
Thermos Corp., is easier to say than “Double walled vessel with a space for a vacuum
between the walls.” 157 A trademark that becomes generic, the very name for the product or
service, is no longer a trademark. 158 Rather, anyone can use the term to market their
product. In the Internet world, some brands quickly go from nothing to world-famous. How
hazardous is that for their legal status?
¶38
Elliot v. Google addressed the question with today’s foremost example. 159 People
refer to "googling" for information, whether the search engine used is Google, Bing, Baidu,
or something else. 160 Has GOOGLE become generic, meaning it is no longer a valid mark?
Id. at 218-19.
Id.
155
Ferring Pharm. v. Watson Pharm., 765 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2014).
156
Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2014).
157
See Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 78
(2014). (discussing how term “Thermos” became generic); Double walled vessel with a space for a vacuum
between the walls, U.S. Patent No. 872,795 (filed Oct. 23, 1906).
158
See, e.g., STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 390
(4th ed. 2012).
159
Elliot v. Google Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127352 (D. Ariz. 2014) (discussing whether “google”
is generic).
160
Id. at *23.
153
154
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The court said no: "As one scholar has stated, ‘top-of-mind use of a trademark in its verb
form, far from indicating the mark’s generic status, may well indicate the enduring fame
of the brand.’" 161
D. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc. 162
¶39

Trademark law also differs from patent and copyright in denying coverage on moral
grounds. The Lanham Act denies registration to a mark that consists “of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest
a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt, or disrepute” 163 Whether registration of the “Washington Redskins”
mark should be cancelled as being disparaging of Native Americans has been the subject
of long-running litigation. 164 A proceeding begun in 1992 before the US Patent and
Trademark Office led to a cancellation, which the courts overturned in 2009 on the grounds
of laches, on the theory that the plaintiffs had waited too long after registration of the mark
in 1967. 165
¶40
In Blackhorse, plaintiffs, too young to have filed any sooner, brought claims
protesting the Washington Redskins name and logo. 166 The TTAB held that the various
trademark registrations used by the Washington Redskins “must be cancelled because they
were disparaging to Native Americans at the respective times they were registered, in
violation of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).”167
Regardless of whether the courts affirm on appeal, the practical effects of the decision are
limited. The decision simply cancels the federal registration of the mark, as opposed to
ending ownership of the mark itself. The mark may still continue as an unregistered mark,
but whether the team can enforce unregistered mark would depend on yet more litigation.
Social developments outside the legal system may bypass the courts.
E. Specht v. Google, Inc. 168
¶41

Trademark rights (again in distinction to patent and copyright) depend on use.
Continued rights require continued use. 169 A dot-com company used the mark “Android
Data” for e-commerce software but stopped operating in 2002. 170 Some brand owners that
discontinue a product keep the trademark rights by continuing minimal use of the mark in
commerce. But the dot.com did not take that course. 171 By ceasing use with intent not to
161
Id. at *13 (quoting Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1313, 1348 (2010)).
162
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B.2014).
163
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
164
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
165
Id.
166
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B.2014). Compare id., with
In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.2014) (“Stop the Islamization of America” not a registrable mark, as
it is disparaging to a substantial composite of American Muslims).
167
Id. at 1082.
168
Specht v. Google, Inc. 747 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2014).
169
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
170
747 F.3d at 931.
171
Id.
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use the mark anymore, it abandoned the mark. 172 When Google later on made “Android”
a famous signifier for a smartphone operating system, the former owner of Android could
not prevent Google obtaining the rights in the mark. 173 The case suggests that parties that
discontinue products may be well advised to follow the practice of continuing using the
marks if they might have commercial value. 174
F. Gutter Topper Ltd. v. Sigman & Sigman Gutters, Inc. 175
¶42

Relatively unsettled is whether liability for intellectual property infringement is
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 176 Bankruptcy discharge of debts will not apply to liability
“for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity.” 177 Gutter Topping shows there may be interplay between awards of attorney’s fees
and whether the liability is dischargeable. The court applied Sixth Circuit precedent
requiring that attorney’s fees may be awarded in trademark cases where “the infringement
was malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate.” 178 The defendant used the plaintiff’s
mark after the licensing agreement had ended, for products clearly not within the scope of
any permission granted, and even after the infringement suit had begun. 179 The court held
the conduct to be “willful and malicious” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s
fees. 180The court also noted that “willful and malicious” was the standard for denying
bankruptcy discharge, although the court was careful not to opine on the question of
dischargeability, which would be addressed separately in the debtor’s bankruptcy
proceeding. 181

Id. at 934.
Id. at 935. See also Dragon Bleu v. VENM, LLC, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (T.T.A.B. 2014)
(holding that, for purposes of USPTO proceedings, the three year period for abandoning registered mark
begins only after registration).
174
See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark 99 YALE L.J. 759, 780 (discussing practice of
“warehousing” trademarks) (1990).
175
Gutter Topper Ltd. v. Sigman & Sigman Gutters, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162034 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 18, 2014).
176
See, e.g., Caitlin McGowan, Copyright Infringement and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of Willful in
Two Statutory Schemes, 20 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 51 (2009); Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that a $675,000 statutory damages award for willful
copyright infringement, by downloading 30 songs, did not violate due process.). See also Elf-Man, LLC v.
C.G. Chinque Albright, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (suggesting large statutory damage
awards for copyright infringement could be excessive punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment).
177
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). See also In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
willfulness requirement means that discharge barred only if infringement is deliberate or intentional, not
reckless)
178
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162034, at *8 (quoting Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 728
(6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 1982))).
179
Id. at 11-13.
180
Id. at 15.
181
Id.
172
173
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G. Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc. 182
¶43

Speare Tools sold its adjustable hole saw in clear plastic packages. 183 When
competitors adopted similar packaging, Speare Tools claimed infringement of trade
dress. 184 Functional matter is not protectable as a trademark. 185 Speare Tools argued that
use of clear plastic packaging was not functional, because there were many other options
open for competitors to package their tools. 186 The court took a broader view of
functionality, relying on the Supreme Court’s statement in TrafFix that a design feature is
functional if it is "essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article." 187 The court also declined to limit the broad view of functionality to
product design, as opposed to product packaging. 188 The snug, see-through plastic
packaging was functional in several ways:
(1) cheaper to produce (because of the use of minimal packaging); (2)
stronger (because of the stepped sides on the blister package); (3) more
appealing to consumers (by reducing cost, revealing the parts of the product
at the point of sale, and including photos and instructions showing how the
product is used); and (4) more appealing to retailers (because of the added
strength, lower cost, nesting capability of the blister packages, and the use
of information provided to consumers at the point of sale). 189
The case makes an interesting contrast to the Oracle v. Google holding on functionality in
copyright law. 190
H. Sandybeachgifts.com v. Amazon.com, Inc. 191 & Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd. 192

¶44

Sandybeachgifts and Skreened bookend the scope of liability for retail web site
owners for their merchants’ sale of infringing products. In the former case, Amazon.com
was not liable for infringement by associates in Amazon’s marketing program. 193 The
associates were independent businesses that allowed Amazon sales through their own
sites. 194 Amazon could terminate the sellers’ participation in the program, but did not share
ownership or have operational control over the sellers. 195

Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162171 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 18, 2014).
Id. at *5-6.
184
Id. at *2-3.
185
Id. at *7.
186
Id. at *8.
187
Id. at *9 (quoting TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Dsplays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)).
188
Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162171, at *10-11 (E.D. Wis. Nov.
18, 2014).
189
Id. at *16.
190
See infra p. 35.
191
Sandybeachgifts.com v. Amazon.com, Inc., 584 F. App’x 713 (9th Cir. 2014).
192
Ohio State Univ. v. Skreened Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 3d 905 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
193
584 F. App’x at 716.
194
Id. at 714-15.
195
Id.
182
183
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By contrast, in Skreened, a T-shirt printing site argued that it was not liable for selling
shirts bearing counterfeit trademarks, because the designs had been uploaded by
customers. 196 Defendants argued that they should not be liable, because they at least
attempted to avoid infringement, by instituting an “autohold” process when they received
complaints from trademark owners. 197 Despite the half-hearted attempted to avoid
infringement, defendants printed numerous infringing shirts. 198 The cost of avoiding
infringement was no defense: “there is no exception in trademark law for infringers who
take an ostrich approach to policing their business activities and complying with the
law.” 199
I. Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management 200 & La Quinta
Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V. 201

¶46

The Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. lowered
barriers to challenging the validity of intellectual property. 202 The Court held that a party
could bring a declaratory judgment action provided there was an actual controversy,

16 F. Supp. 3d at 917.
Id. at 916.
198
Id. at 916-17.
199
Id. at 917.
200
Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 744 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2014).
201
La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2014).
202
549 U.S. 118 (2007).
196
197
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rejecting cases requiring a higher standard. 203 Airs Aromatics rejected an attempt to further
lower the standard in trademark cases. 204
¶47
The trademark statute allows courts to cancel a mark for invalidity. 205 The Airs
Aromatics court noted the trademark statute provides that “cancellation is available in ‘any
action involving a registered mark.’" 206 That language does not provide an independent
cause of action to cancel a mark. 207 Rather, it provides a possible remedy in an action
involving a mark, where the court already has jurisdiction, such as an infringement or
declaratory judgment action. 208 Converting every statutory provision that gives powers to
a court into a jurisdictional provision would greatly multiply the routes to federal
jurisdiction. It would also negate the limits on jurisdiction. Moreover, a party seeking
cancellation may already file a cancellation proceeding in the US Patent and Trademark
office, an appropriate venue to begin consideration of whether that office should cancel a
mark.
¶48
By the same token, the same circuit ruled in La Quinta Worldwide that the statutory
requirement that infringing use of a trademark be a “use in commerce” was not a
jurisdictional requirement. 209 The trademark statute provides that trademark infringement
is a “use in commerce” of a symbol confusingly similar to a mark may infringe. 210 But the
relevant provisions provide a cause of action, rather than jurisdiction to hear the case. 211
Rather, the jurisdictional provision of the trademark statute provides broad jurisdiction
over cases arising under the statute. 212
J.
¶49

Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC 213

Flying Pigs sought to enforce an equitable lien for failure to pay rent by foreclosing
on federally registered trademarks. 214 The Fourth Circuit held that a federal court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. 215 Although a federally registered trademark was
involved, the action was not brought under the federal trademark statute and raised no
question of federal law. 216 There is considerable uncertainty about, at the outset of a
financing transaction, whether federal or state law governs the requirements of notice when
making a loan using intellectual property as collateral. 217 If Flying Pigs is followed, there

Id. at 137.
744 F.3d 595.
205
15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2012).
206
Airs Aromatics, 744 F.3d at 599 (citing § 1119).
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2014).
210
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012).
211
La Quinta, 762 F.3d at 873-74.
212
See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012). The court relied on the distinction between elements of a claim and
jurisdictional requirements, stressed in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
213
Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC, 757 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2014).
214
Id. at 179.
215
Id. at 182-83.
216
Id.
217
See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Financing Innovation: Legal Development of Intellectual Property as
Security in Financing, 48 IND. L. R. 509, 528-39 (2015).
203
204
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will be less uncertainty at the end of a financing transaction, as to which law governs when
the creditor seeks to sell the collateral upon default by the debtor.
K. Webceleb, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co. 218
¶50

Webceleb reinforces a point that evidently needs to be repeated. 219 A trademark
owner does not own the word, rather only the right to prevent confusingly similar uses with
respect to sales of goods or services. 220 The defendants used “Favorite Web Celeb” as the
category in an awards show and on a related web site. 221 Unbeknownst to them,
WEBCELEB was a registered mark. 222 But those uses of a similar phrase would not
confuse any potential consumer about the source of relevant goods or services. 223 A
trademark, unlike a patent or copyright, does not bestow a broad set of exclusive rights in
the relevant information. 224
III. COPYRIGHT
A. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc. 225

¶51

Even as Alice put the validity of many software patents in question, Oracle v. Google
supports thicker copyright protection to software than leading cases. 226 Copyright protects

Webceleb, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 554 Fed. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2014).
On over-enforcement of trademarks generally, see Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark
Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011).
220
554 Fed. App’x at 607.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 607-08 (“Any minimal confusion here is the "risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to
identify its product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive phrase.") (quoting KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004)).
225
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
226
Id.
218
219
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only creative expression, not functional matter. 227 Software qualifies for copyright
protection, as a literary work, 228 but the trend of authority had been to give thin protection.
Oracle potentially reverses that trend, creating a split in approach between the circuit
courts. 229
To enable Android, the operating system for smart phones, to run Java, Google
copied many of Java’s API’s (application programming interfaces). 230 Android copied the
names and headers for the Java modules. For example, Google would copy the header
“java.lang.Math.max,” for a method that compares numbers. 231 Google wrote its own code
that does the comparison and returns a result. 232 Java programmers could readily write
apps for Android. 233 This increased the number of software developers who could write
Android apps, and would allow them to use some of the code they had written for other
Java projects. 234
The issue was whether Google had copied protected creative expression, when it
copied the names, organization of those names, and functionality of 37 out of 166 packages
in the Java API. 235 The Federal Circuit reasoned that copyright protects Java’s “structure,
sequence and organization.” 236 Because the makers of Java could have used different
names and organization for the API’s, the names that were chosen represented creative
expression, not just functional elements. 237
The Federal Circuit rejected application of the approach taken by the First Circuit in
Lotus v. Borland.238 Lotus had held that the menu command structure for a spreadsheet was
a noncopyrightable “method of operation.” 239 The menu command structure provided
commands for spreadsheet users, such as Print, Copy, Subtract, and arranged them in a
hierarchy. 240 By copying that hierarchy, the defendant enabled the plaintiff’s former users
to readily use defendants’ spreadsheet software 241 – not unlike Java developers in Oracle.
This holding, that the menu hierarchy was an uncopyrightable method of operation, was
rejected in Oracle, in favor of using the more detailed abstraction-comparison-filtration
analysis. 242
How wide the circuit split is remains to be determined. The Federal Circuit did not
conclude that Google necessarily infringed the copyright in Java. 243 Rather, it remanded
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) ( “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
228
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
229
750 F.3d at 1358.
230
Id. at 1350-51.
231
Id. at 1349.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 1350-51.
234
Id. at 1349.
235
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
236
Id.
237
Id. at 1366-68.
238
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
239
Id. at 815.
240
Id. at 817.
241
Id. at 818.
242
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
243
Id. at 1377.
227
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the case on the issues of whether Google’s copying was permitted in order to copy
nonprotected functional expression and whether Google was protected by fair use. 244 So
the Federal Circuit and First Circuit reached slightly different conclusions that had large
impact for litigation of software copyright cases. 245 The First Circuit, by holding that
interface specifications were not protected, as a method of operation, simplified the
analysis. 246 The Federal Circuit requires more steps in the litigation: First, determining
whether there are separate creative elements in interfaces, and then seeing whether copying
of any protected expression is permitted under various doctrines, such as copying to
implement functionality or copying permitted under fair use. 247 The application of those
doctrines, in turn, will introduce a number of legal and factual issues not required under
the First Circuit approach in Lotus. Fair use, for example, requires consideration of four
factors, much more broad than considering simply the issue of functionality. 248
¶56
For now, Oracle casts a shadow on the practice of copying interfaces. The WINE
project, for example, is a free software project that allows users to run Windows programs
on Linux systems. 249 WINE relies on using Windows applications programming
interfaces. 250 It could be susceptible to infringement claims if courts read software
copyright broadly.
B. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 251
¶57

Digital technologies rely on copying, so courts interpreting words in the copyright
statute can have broad implications on technology. The second paragraph of the definition
of “public performance” (called the “transmit clause”) was added to the copyright statute
to cover rebroadcasting by cable companies. 252 In early days, cable companies would
capture broadcast television shows on antennas and rebroadcast the shows over their cable
network. 253 The Supreme Court had held that this was not a public performance, and so
the cable company did not need permission from the television show copyright holder.254
Those copyright holders promptly convinced Congress to include such rebroadcasting in
their exclusive rights, adding the “transmit clause” to the copyright holder’s public
performance right. 255 In 2008, the Second Circuit interpreted the clause narrowly. 256 The
Id.
Id.
246
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
247
750 F.3d at 1377.
248
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating four factors for fair use analysis).
249
See WINEHQ, https://www.winehq.org/.
250
“Wine translates Windows API calls into POSIX calls on-the-fly, eliminating the performance and
memory penalties of other methods and allowing you to cleanly integrate Windows applications into your
desktop.” About Wine, WINEHQ, https://www.winehq.org/about/.
251
Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
252
Id. at 2505-06.
253
Id. at 2504.
254
Id. at 2504-05, discussing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
255
Id. at 2506 (“Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which specifies that an entity performs
publicly when it ‘transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . to the public.’ §101; see ibid. (defining ‘[t]o “transmit”
a performance’ as ‘to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received
beyond the place from which they are sent’).”).
256
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
244
245
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Second Circuit had held that there was no public performance where customers of
Cablevision used remote storage provided by Cablevision to record programs and watch
them at their leisure. 257 The court noted the broad scope of the transmission clause,
applying where members of the public receive the transmission “in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.” 258 But the clause applies only
to members of the public “capable of receiving the performance.” 259 Because the
performance is the single copy transmitted, the court reasoned, only the single customer
was capable of receiving it, meaning that it was not a public performance. 260 Rather, many
Cablevision customers could make private performances of the same program from their
individual remote storage devices provided by Cablevision. 261
¶58
Aereo created a convoluted rebroadcasting system designed to piggyback on the
Cablevision decision. 262 Aereo’s system had thousands of tiny antennas, each coupled with
a small storage device. 263 An Aereo customer could control their antenna and storage to
record programs or rebroadcast them to the customer. 264 The Second Circuit again held
that meant that each customer had a private performance, even if thousands of customers
were watching the same broadcast show. 265 The Supreme Court reversed, looking both to
the broader language (“in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times”) and to the purpose of the statute. 266 In the Court’s view, Aereo was doing
the same sort of rebroadcasting that the definition was designed to target:
Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs,
many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast. In
providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, housed in a
centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes. By means of its
technology (antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s]
programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by private
channels to additional viewers.” 267
¶59

The question after Aereo is how broadly it applies. The Court took care not to cast a
cloud on technological development, stating that it was not ruling on issues of cloud
computing, remote storage DVRs, and other novel issues to arise in other cases. 268

Id.
Id. at 134.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 135-36.
261
Id.
262
Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503-04.
263
Id. at 2503.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 2503-04.
266
Id. at 2509 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
267
Id. at 2506 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)).
268
Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511.
257
258
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C. Petrella v. MGM 269
¶60

Petrella provides copyright owners some latitude in enforcement. Copyright has a
three-year statute of limitations. 270 If a defendant continues to infringe, however, each new
infringement is separate, starting a new three-year period for filing suit based on the new
infringements. 271 Where the 1980 film Raging Bull allegedly infringed a 1963 screenplay,
the copyright holder brought an action in 2009 seeking to recover for infringements (such
as public performances) that occurred in 2006 and thereafter. 272 MGM sought the
application of the equitable doctrine of laches, under which a defendant that unreasonably
delays in enforcement may lose its right to damages. 273 The Supreme Court held that where
Congress has set a statutory time limit, there is no place for equity to add an additional time
limit.274 The Court noted (among other reasons), that a contrary rule might create more
copyright litigation, because copyright owners would fear losing their rights if they did not
sue even for trivial infringement. 275
D. Garcia v. Google, Inc. 276

¶61

Cindy Lee Garcia played a minor role in a film with the working title “Desert
Warrior.” 277 After the project was abandoned, the pragmatic producer used the footage of
her scenes in an anti-Islamic film titled “Innocence of Muslims,” dubbing lines over her
performance. 278

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
271
134 S. Ct. at 1969-70.
272
Id. at 1970-71.
273
Id. at 1975-76.
274
Id. at 1974.
275
Id.
276
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir.
2014).
277
Id. at 932.
278
Id.
269
270
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¶62

The Ninth Circuit held that, although the director held the copyright in the film,
Garcia might have a copyrightable interest in her performance. 279 Copyright applies to an
original work of authorship, fixed in a tangible medium. 280 The court made a convincing
argument that Garcia made an original contribution, which requires some creativity: “But
an actor does far more than speak words on a page; he must ‘live his part inwardly, and
then . . . give to his experience an external embodiment.’” 281 That embodiment includes
body language, facial expression, and reactions to other actors and elements of a scene. Id.
at 218-219. Otherwise, “‘every shmuck . . . is an actor because everyone . . . knows how to
read.’” 282
¶63
But the court did not explain how a performance would qualify as a work of
authorship. This view seems to make a film an amalgamation of many works of authorship,
as would be any other work with contributions from more than one person. That doctrinal
innovation would have considerable practical consequences, making a potential author out
of anyone with any input into a work, greatly increasing the need for negotiation and
transaction costs. 283 Before the end of the year, the Ninth Circuit decided to rehear the
case en banc. 284 Perhaps the case will live on mainly in copyright law courses.
E. Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG 285
¶64

Oracle provides guidance on awards of reasonable royalties in copyright cases. The
court overturned a jury award of some $1.3 billion, because Oracle’s evidence as to the
value of damages flowing from copyright infringement by unauthorized use of software
was speculative, with no showing of how much income SAP gained from the
infringement. 286 But the court showed several ways in which a plaintiff could show a
reasonable royalty, which would be what the parties likely would have agreed on had they
negotiated a license. 287 First, the court rejected the theory that there could be no
hypothetical license because Oracle never licensed its software. 288 The very point of
figuring out a hypothetical license fee is that there was no actual transaction. 289 Second,
evidence of revenue from infringement should be more than simply projections of hopedfor income, which were not linked directly to the infringing activity. 290 Likewise, the cost
Id. at 935.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
281
766 F.3d at 934, quoting Constantin Stanislavski, An Actor Prepares 15, 219 (Elizabeth Reynolds
Hapgood trans., 1936).
282
766 F.3d at 945, quoting Sanford Meisner & Dennis Longwell, Sanford Meisner on Acting 178
(1987).
283
See e.g., Venkat Balasubramani, In Its “Innocence of Muslims” Ruling, the Ninth Circuit is Guilty
of Judicial Activism-Garcia v. Google. Technology & Marketing Law Blog (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/02/in-its-innocence-of-muslims-ruling-the-ninth-circuit-isguilty-of-judicial-activism-garcia-v-google.htm. See also Rebecca Tushnet, March 17, 2014, My long, sad
Garcia v. Google post, Rebecca Tushnet's 43(B)log (March 17, 2014),
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/03/my-long-sad-garcia-v-google-post.html.
284
Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014).
285
Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2014).
286
Id. at 1091.
287
Id. at 1087-88.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 1090.
279
280
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to plaintiff of granting a license could be shown more directly than simply how much it
cost to acquire the entities that made the software, because the software could be licensed
to multiple licensees. 291 Lastly, actual licenses granted with respect to the subject matter
would provide objective evidence to support the terms of a hypothetical license. 292
F. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust 293
¶65

Does fair use protect the Google Book project? Google is attempting to scan the
world’s books, presently working with a number of libraries and Google’s innovative
scanning technology. 294 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust held that fair use protected
unauthorized scanning and compiling of books into a searchable database. 295 The case
involved only a limited set of purposes, so it is only preliminary to applying fair use to
Google Books as a whole. 296 Google scanned books from the collection of member
libraries, such as universities. 297 Any web user could search the database and receive
results showing only books containing the search terms, along with page numbers (no
snippets of text, unlike Google Books). 298 Member libraries could use the database to
enable readers with disabilities (such as blindness or inability to turn pages) to use adaptive
technologies, such as software that magnified the text or read it aloud. 299 Member libraries
could also use electronic copies to replace lost originals. 300 Fair use protected these limited
uses. The case leaves open broader questions, such as searches that return portions of texts
and provide information used for commercial purposes, not to mention advertising revenue.
G. Cambridge University Press v. Patton 301

¶66

Fair use is a bulwark of copyright law, but somewhat unpredictable, perhaps because
the relevant rule is a four factor test with little guidance as to how to weigh the factors. 302
The trial court in Cambridge University Press had introduced a little bright line
guidance. 303 For university copying for coursebooks, it had held that copying 10 percent
of a work or just one chapter was presumptively fair use. 304 The appellate court reversed

Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 765 F.3d 1081, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1092.
293
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). See also Swatch Group Mgmt. Servs.
v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that the distribution of a recording of a company’s
conference call with analysts disclosing earning was fair use).
294
See 755 F.3d at 90.
295
See id. at 105.
296
See id. at 91-92.
297
See id.at 90.
298
See id.at 91.
299
See id.
300
See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014).
301
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Dan Nabel, Top 10 Fair
Use Cases of 2014, TECHNOLOGY & MARKETING LAW BLOG,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/01/top-10-fair-use-cases-of-2014-guest-blog-post.htm.
302
See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271,
1284 (2008) (characterizing fair use as unpredictable and uncertain).
303
769 F.3d at 1271-72.
304
Id.
291
292
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that approach, holding that a case-by-case approach must be taken. 305 In particular, the
court also placed more weight on the market impact of the possible loss of licensing
revenue, which could be realized through such means as the Copyright Clearance
Center. 306
H. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd. 307
¶67

Some Sherlock Holmes stories, published before 1922, are out of copyright, but later
stories are still under copyright. 308 Klinger began a project to write a sequel featuring
Sherlock Holmes. 309 After author Conan Doyle’s estate threatened to sue for infringement,
Klinger filed a declaratory judgment action. 310 The estate argued that using Sherlock
Holmes would copy creative expression from the later stories, because the complex
character Sherlock Holmes changed over time. 311 The Seventh Circuit held that second
author could freely copy the character Sherlock Holmes from the public domain. 312 Only
if the estate could show specific copying of expression would there be infringement. 313
The court rejected the argument that the later Sherlock Holmes could not be distinguished
from earlier Sherlock Holmes. 314 If there was no difference, then there would be no
additional original expression to merit additional copyright protection.

Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1281.
307
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014).
308
Id. at 497.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 498.
311
Id. at 501-02.
312
Id.
313
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2014).
314
Id. at 501-02.
305
306
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I. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. 315
¶68

Sixties musicians, Flo & Eddie of The Turtles, truly keep on truckin’. The 1976
federal Copyright Act held that the public performance right in pre 1972 sound recordings
(as opposed to the copyright in musical works) was not governed by federal law. 316
Decades later, two federal trial courts have held that pre 1972 sound recordings are
recognized by state law copyright. 317 If the decisions in the key jurisdictions of California
and New York survive appeal, then broadcasters may have to pay for rights to play songs
that they have long played for free (not to mention damages for recent use). 318 Arranging
such transactions may be cumbersome, because existing licensing statutory schemes apply
only to works under federal copyright. Such recordings may also trigger liability for online
services such as YouTube, because the immunity of online service providers under the
DMCA arguably extends only to federal copyright. 319 Flower power may disturb the
establishment once again.
J. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. 320

¶69

Inhale addressed the same general issue as Oracle vs. Google, the distinction
between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable functional matter. 321 The product
at issue was the design of a water pipe system for smoking. 322 Broad copyright protection
in product design would effectively give patent protection for an unpatented product. The
shape of the hookah water container was not subject to copyright protection. 323 Although
the shape was distinctive and artistic, it did not have aesthetic elements that were separable

Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139053 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22,
2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2014).
316
See Lee Gesmer, The Kerfuffle Over Copyrights in Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, MASS IP BLOG
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://masslawblog.com/copyright/the-kerfuffle-over-copyrights-in-pre-1972-soundrecordings/ (discussing practical impact of Flo and Eddie and possible judicial and legislative
developments).
317
Decisions are both captioned Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Flo & Eddie I), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139053 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) and Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Flo &
Eddie II), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
318
Flo & Eddie II; Flo & Eddie I.
319
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 881, 887 (Sup. Ct. 2012)
(recognizing the issue unsettled and holding that immunity may apply to state law claims).
320
Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 739 F.3d 446 (9th Cir.) opinion amended and superseded on
denial of reh'g, 755 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (July 9, 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 758
(2014).
321
Id. at 448-49.
322
Id. at 447.
323
Id. at 448-49.
315
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from its function. 324 If the shape of the water container were changed, it would work
differently. 325

¶70

Inhale and Oracle involve quite different subject matter, software and a hookah water
container—yet they consider the same issue—functionality. Under Oracle’s reasoning,
perhaps Inhale would be decided differently, because there are many different shapes of
water containers that would serve the same general function. 326 Likewise, Inhale’s
approach could yield a different result in Oracle: changing the API’s would make the
software function in a different way. 327 The difficult question is whether the cases are
legally inconsistent or simply governed by the difference in subject matter.
K. AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe 328

¶71

Various enterprises seek to find a way to recover from alleged small-scale copyright
infringements. AF Holdings rejected an attempt to bring infringement actions en masse.329
The plaintiffs bought the copyright to a film and sued 1,058 anonymous defendants,
identified only by IP address, alleging that each had downloaded the film using
BitTorrent. 330 Multiple defendants may be joined for actions “with respect to or arising

Id.
Id.
326
Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 739 F.3d 446, 448-49 (9th Cir.) (applying test based on
existing shape, not alternatives).
327
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying test based on
availability of alternatives).
328
AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1058, 752 F.3d 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
329
Id. at 992.
330
Id.
324
325
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out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” 331 But,
getting the film from different BitTorrent swarms on dates months apart was not the same
series of transactions, any more than “two individuals who play at the same blackjack table
at different times.” 332
L. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC 333

¶72

The Seventh Circuit held that it was fair use to use a photograph of a mayor,
downloaded from the city’s website, to make a T-Shirt mocking the mayor. 334 The key was
that little of the creative expression of the original was used:
Defendants removed so much of the original that, as with the Cheshire Cat,
only the smile remains. Defendants started with a low-resolution version
posted on the City's website, so much of the original's detail never had a
chance to reach the copy; the original's background is gone; its colors and
shading are gone; the expression in Soglin's eyes can no longer be read;
after the posterization (and reproduction by silk-screening), the effect of the
lighting in the original is almost extinguished. What is left, besides a hint of
Soglin's smile, is the outline of his face, which can't be copyrighted.
Defendants could have achieved the same effect by starting with a snapshot taken on the street. 335

¶73

The court’s pragmatic approach varies from fair use case law in two significant ways.
First, to make the T-Shirt, the defendants had to make copies along the way in the process

FED R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A).
752 F.3d at 998.
333
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
334
Id. at 759.
335
Id.
331
332
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of making the design. 336 In other cases, such as reverse-engineering or data-base extraction,
courts have considered whether such intermediate copies were infringing or were fair
use 337 (although the Seventh Circuit noted that a low-resolution copy was used). 338
Second, the court did not look to whether the use was “transformative,” a question that
other courts give great weight in fair use. 339 The court stated that it was “skeptical” of that
approach, because it gives little weight to the list of factors in Section 107 and because
equating “transformative” with fair use threatens to do away with the copyright owner’s
exclusive right to make derivative works. 340

IV. TRADE SECRET
A. Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer 341
¶74

Contract law may provide an alternative or supplement to trade-secret protection.
Showing breach of a nondisclosure or non-compete agreement does not require as high a
showing as misappropriating a trade secret. 342 Breach of contract does not require the same
elements as misappropriation and the information at issue need not be proved to be a trade
secret. 343 The contract at issue in Loftness defined protected information much more
broadly than a trade secret (“[s]uch information that [T & A] considers to be proprietary
and/or confidential”) and the acts that constituted breach likewise more broadly than the
wrongful actions that would constitute misappropriation (promising not to use T&A’s
Id. at 757.
See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying fair use to
intermediate copying for reverse engineering).
338
766 F.3d at 759.
339
Id. at 758.
340
Id.
341
Loftness Specialized Farm Equip., Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2014). By contrast,
where a party freely allows information to circulate without restrictions, a nondisclosure agreement with
one party will not make the information a trade secret. See nClosures Inc. v. Block & Co., 770 F.3d 598
(7th Cir. 2014).
342
742 F.3d at 850-51.
343
Id.
336
337
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"confidential information in any way that could be construed as being competitive of [T &
A’s] business"). 344 The appellate court held it was error to grant summary judgment on the
grounds that the defendant had not misappropriated a trade secret. 345 Rather, the court
remanded for the question of whether the defendant had breached its broader obligations
under the contract. 346
B. United States v. Auernheimer 347

Auernheimer promised to be key precedent for trade secret practice, but the court
decided the case on other grounds. 348 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")349
prohibits unauthorized access to computers. Courts have differed on how to construe
unauthorized access. 350 Suppose an employee uses her work computer to load up on
valuable trade secrets from her employer’s stock, then takes the information to a competitor
or her own start-up. Some courts would hold this would not be not unauthorized access,
because her employer gave her access to the files. 351 Other courts may hold it unauthorized,
because she exceeded the scope of authorization given – her employer did not give her
permission to take the trade secrets for her own purposes. 352
¶76
Auernheimer is not an employee case, but was widely watched on the issue of
unauthorized use. Auernheimer exploited a security flaw to visit public AT&T web sites
(by making it look as if he were using an iPad) and get email addresses of iPad users from
¶75

Id. at 848.
Id. at 851.
346
Id.
347
United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014).
348
Id. at 541 (reversing for lack of venue, not reaching issue of the extent to which CFAA protects
trade secrets).
349
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) et seq. (2012).
350
See 748 F.3d at 541.
351
See, e.g., WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
352
See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
344
345

352
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AT&T. 353 Unauthorized access? Auernheimer argued not, because he was visiting sites
that were open to the public. 354 The prosecution, successful in the trial court, argued that it
was because Auernheimer’s software was configured, in a broad and anthropomorphic
sense, to deceive AT&T’s web server, negating any authorization. 355 On appeal, the Third
Circuit did not reach this juicy issue, holding instead that the prosecution had been brought
in the wrong district. 356 Auernheimer acted in Fayetteville, Arkansas, accessing servers
in Dallas, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia. 357 The case was brought in New Jersey, which had
no apparent connection to the case. 358 The conviction was vacated, leaving the uncertainty
around the CFAA unchanged. 359
C. Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm 360
¶77

A contractual promise in an employment agreement not to compete may serve as a
proxy for trade-secret protection. Trade secret misappropriation by an employee may be
very difficult to show. 361 A promise not to work for competitors may reduce the chance
that a former employee may use trade secrets – although such clauses must be limited to
their reasonable scope, both to protect the employee’s ability to work in the market and to
foster the general policy of freedom of flow of experts and expertise. 362
¶78
Covenants not to compete are enforceable only if reasonable, because of the
limitation on the employee. 363 But that does not make them any more difficult (in
jurisdictions that enforce them) to agree to than other clauses. A restrictive covenant in a
click-wrap employment agreement was enforceable, even where changes in employment
terms were not made conspicuous. 364 Rather, the terms fell within the reasonable
expectations of the parties, despite the fact the employee did not read the agreement before
agreeing. 365 Even the most formalistic contract doctrines with respect to written contracts
did not require proof that a party had read all provisions of a contract before being bound. 366
That approach is more efficient than a regime that would require parties to spend time and
resources reading (and documenting that reading) for every provision in a contract.

748 F.3d at 529-31.
See id. at 534.
355
See id. at 531-32.
356
Id. at 541.
357
Id.at 533-36.
358
Id. at 536.
359
United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 541 (3d Cir. 2014).
360
Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014).
361
See, e.g., id. at *40 (upholding injunction for potential breach of contract, without showing of actual
misappropriation of trade secrets).
362
Id. at *20.
363
Id.
364
Id. at *20-22.
365
Id.
366
See, e.g., Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115, 126 (Md. 1952) (“One who makes a written offer which is
accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to
be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of
its proper interpretation.”) (quoting Restatement -- Contracts, Section 70).
353
354

353

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2015

D. Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, L.L.C. 367
¶79

In trade secret law, even post eBay, a showing of misappropriation may almost
automatically lead to an injunction: when “a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a
position to use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed.” 368 The same overall
framework for granting an injunction governs, but the requirement of irreparable harm is
more easily met. 369 Trade secret poses different risks than patent, copyright, and trademark.
Not only is it misappropriation to use trade secret information wrongfully, it is
misappropriation to simply wrongfully acquire the information. 370 If the information
becomes public, it will no longer be a trade secret. 371 Courts readily grant injunctions to
protect trade secrets, where wrongful behavior is involved. 372 In Core Labs, former
employees of the plaintiff took a secret software application and associated customer
information to a start-up competitor, saving the cost of developing such information
themselves and providing a market advantage. 373
E. Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc. 374 & ABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc. 375

¶80

Trade secret and patent law interact in many ways. An inventor may choose between
keeping in invention secret and publishing it to get a patent. A patentee may use patent law
to protect an invention, but also use trade secret processes in connection with practicing
the invention, to have two lines of defenses against copiers.
¶81
Wang v. Palo Alto Networks involved a less common intersection. Wang alleged that
his business partner had wrongfully disclosed trade secret firewall technology to Palo Alto
Networks. 376 Wang did not sue until after several years after the alleged disclosure, but
alleged that the statute of limitations had not run because he learned of the disclosure only
But the
by reading newspaper accounts of Palo Alto’s initial public offering. 377
information had been contained in published patent applications of Palo Alto, at a time
when Wang was seeking his own patents. 378 The court held that a trade secret owner was
on constructive notice of other patent applications in the area of technology. 379 Wang had
the requisite notice to run afoul of the statute of limitations, which started running at that
time. 380
Core Labs. v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., LLC, 532 Fed. App’x 904 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Where defendant
used plaintiff’s trade secret fracking software, there was irreparable harm and an injunction would apply).
368
Id. at 909 (quoting IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.
2005)).
369
Id. at 910-11.
370
Id.
371
Id. at 911 (holding injunction appropriate to protect confidential information and trade secrets).
372
Id. (“Spectrum's possession of Core's trade secret information is presumptively improper and its
adverse use during the potentially prolonged PTO reexamination and appeal periods is not likely to be fully
remediable by monetary damages.”).
373
Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Services, LLC, 532 Fed. App’x 904, 909-11 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
374
Wang v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014).
375
ABB Turbo Sys. AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
376
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50737 at *13-14.
377
Id. at *24-25.
378
Id. at *23.
379
Id. at *20.
380
Id. at *20-21.
367
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In ABB Turbo, the alleged trade secret misappropriation likewise was long before the
action was filed. 381 ABB Turbo alleged that a former employee handed over envelopes of
cash to ABB employees for confidential business information for decades. 382 The
information related to patents (which were also allegedly infringed). 383 Unlike Wang,
there was no public information available to the trade secret owner disclosing the
information. 384 The statute of limitations did not begin to run until ABB Turbo learned of
the information sales. 385
F. Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. 386

The defendant in Altavion argued that there was a choice between trade secret and
patent protection, at least for product design: “[g]eneralized ideas and inventions are
protectable by patents and thus cannot be trade secrets.” 387 There is a boundary between
copyright and patent: functional matter may be patentable, but is not subject to copyright.
But trade secret and patent overlap in covering functional matter, such as product design.
Rather, as the court emphasized, it is disclosure that separates trade secret from patent
subject matter. 388 Until disclosure, both may potentially cover valuable information: if “a
patentable idea is kept secret, the idea itself can constitute information protectable by trade
secret law.” 389
¶84
Nor had the plaintiff lost trade secret protection by disclosing its general idea for
digital stamping technology to potential partners. 390 It made it general idea public, but did
not disclose its specific design implementation for the technology, which remained a trade
secret. 391 Keeping trade secret protection does not require absolute secrecy, even about
the existence of the technology itself. 392 Likewise, that design implementation would be
disclosed when the product was sold to the public. But until that time, the implementation
technology would be valuable because it had not been disclosed to others, and would
remain a trade secret. 393

¶83

G. Bianco v. Globus Medical, Inc. 394
¶85

An idea for a product can be a trade secret. Misappropriation will lie, even if the
defendant uses the idea for a different product than envisioned. 395 A trade secret may have
broader value than simply instructing how to make a particular product, and may have
ABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 982-83.
383
Id.
384
Id.
385
Id. at 985-86.
386
Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26 (171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714).
387
Id. at 53 (quoting defendants’ brief).
388
Id. at 55-56.
389
Id. at 55.
390
Id. at 58-59.
391
Id.
392
Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc, 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 57 (171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714).
393
Id. at 60-61.
394
Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151967 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2014).
395
Id. at *39-44.
381

382
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value in formulating other products as well. 396 The fact that the defendant may have
supplied additional value, such as research or market analysis, will not absolve the
defendant of liability for wrongfully using the protected information. 397
H. Mandel v. Thrasher (In re Mandel) 398
¶86

Intellectual property encourages innovation. Intellectual property litigation can
likewise result in innovation. Mandel v. Thrassher rejected the creative theory that, where
an executive stole trade secrets, he authorized their disclosure on the part of the
company. 399 If the disclosure was authorized, then there would be no liability for wrongful
disclosure. Such a rule would swallow much of trade secret law with respect to employees,
not to mention insulate fiduciaries from responsibility for breach of their duties. 400
¶87
The case also makes a holding similar to Oracle v. SAP, that an award of damages
requires evidentiary support. 401 The bankruptcy court held that the plaintiffs’ expert
testimony did not establish an amount of damages recoverable under either a "lost asset"
or "lost profit" theory. 402 The court nevertheless awarded the nice round amounts in
damages of $1,000,000 and $400,000 to the respective plaintiffs, without any
explanation. 403 The appellate court remanded the case for the lower court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing or explain the basis of its award. 404
I. Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee; 405 In re Valero Ref.-Tex.; 406 Powder River Basin
Reservation Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Commission; 407 & In re
Microbilt Corp. 408
¶88

A party would not be permitted to do forensic imaging of a laptop in discovery, where
the laptop contained trade secrets not related to the litigation and less intrusive means had
been rejected during discovery discussions. 409 Valero held that financial records which
could qualify as trade secrets might not be discoverable in tax collection litigation, without
a showing of particularized need. 410 Powder River Basin held that fracking methods
disclosed to the government might not be disclosed if they were protected as trade
secrets. 411
Id.
Id.
398
Mandel v. Thrasher (In re Mandel), 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709 (5th Cir. 2014).
399
Id. at *16-17.
400
Id.
401
Id. at *31-34.
402
Id.
403
Id.
404
In re Mandel, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15709 *31-34.
405
Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107584 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014).
406
In re Valero Ref.-Tex., No. 01-14-00149-CV (Tex. App., August 21, 2014).
407
Powder River Basin Reservation Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014 WY 37
(Wyo. 2014); Cynthia J. Rigsby, Trade Secret vs. Patent Protection: Consider FOIA or Public Records
Requests, www.iplitigationcurrent.com (Mar. 13, 2014).
408
In re Microbilt Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23212 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2014)
409
Boston Scientific Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107584 at *17-22.
410
No. 01-14-00149-CV (Tex. App., Aug. 21, 2014).
411
2014 WY 37 (Wyo. 2014); see Rigsby, supra note 407.
396
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On the flip side, sometimes a trade secret owner cannot get remedies from a confidant
that discloses the trade secret, a nondisclosure agreement notwithstanding. For example,
in In re Microbilt, Chex, a data provider, sued several of its resellers. 412 In court filings,
Chex included trade secrets, such as a customer list, provided to it by Microbilt under a
confidentiality agreement. 413 Microbilt’s action for trade secret misappropriation, by
wrongful disclosure, foundered on the absolute litigation privilege, which protects
disclosures to courts. 414
J. Hallmark Cards v. Monitor Clipper Partners 415

¶90

Hallmark Cards provided confidential market research, in Powerpoint format, to
consultant Monitor Company Group under a nondisclosure agreement. 416 Monitor
Company group nonetheless sent the information on to its affiliate Monitor Clipper
Partners, a private equity firm, which used it to acquire and manage a competitor of
Hallmark Cards. 417 Monitor Clipper Partners argued that the information was not a trade
secret, because Hallmark had made public general conclusions based on the research.418
But as the court concluded, the data was valuable as basis for analysis: other parties might
have reached other conclusions from the data. Total secrecy is not a prerequisite for trade
secret protection. 419
K. Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc. 420

¶91

Bluestem upholds the use of a clean room development in financial engineering, not
unlike a clean room in software reverse engineering. 421 As a step toward a possible merger,
two retailers shared information under a non-disclosure agreement. 422 The merger fell
through. 423 Bluestem Brands subsequently unveiled a payroll deduction plan to help buyers
finance big purchases. 424 Purchasing Power alleged the process was taken from
information provided in confidence. 425 Bluestem produced evidence that the process was
developed independently by a team kept separate from those involved in the potential
merger. 426 Purchasing Power had no direct evidence that its information was used, only
such “circumstantial” evidence as general similarities between the programs. 427 The courts
found no misappropriation. 428 In the big picture, the case is helpful for trade secret
In re Microbilt Corp., No. 11-18143, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4566 at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013).
Microbilt Corp. v. Chex Sys., 588 F. App’x 179, 180-81 (10th Cir. 2014).
414
Id. at 180.
415
Hallmark Cards v. Monitor Clipper Partners, 758 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014).
416
Id. at 1054-55.
417
Id.
418
Id. at 1056-57.
419
Id.
420
Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
421
Id. at 1317-18.
422
Id. at 1308-09.
423 Id. at 1309
424
Id. at 1309-10.
425
Id. at 1310.
426
Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1317-18 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
427
Id. at 1316-17.
428
Id. at 1317-18.
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owners. If independent development were not a defense in such settings, then parties might
be more reluctant to enter into nondisclosure agreements, because they would lose the
ability to develop information themselves that the other party already had.
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